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ARREST—REASONABLENESS: 
THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT PERMITS 
INVESTIGATIVE STOPS BASED ON ANONYMOUS TIPS 
Navarette v. California, 134 S. Ct. 1683 (2014). 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
In Navarette v. California, the United States Supreme Court held that a 
traffic stop based on an anonymous, but reliable, tip did not violate the 
Fourth Amendment where the tip provided the officer with reasonable 
suspicion.  The Court reasoned that the 911 call provided adequate 
indications of reliability to verify the credibility of the caller.  Therefore, the 
officer was justified in relying on an anonymous tip to make an 
investigative traffic stop.  By the caller’s specific details of the truck and the 
incident, the Court reasoned that the caller claimed eyewitness knowledge 
of the alleged reckless driving, which supported the reliability of the 
anonymous tip.  The Court also reasoned that the caller’s report of being 
run off the road created reasonable suspicion of an ongoing crime of drunk 
driving.  As a result, the Court’s holding in Navarette allows law 
enforcement to make an investigative stop with minimal justification. 
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I. FACTS 
On August 23, 2008, a 911-dispatch team for the California Highway 
Patrol received a call from the dispatch team of a neighboring county.1  The 
neighboring county’s dispatcher relayed an anonymous tip from a 
concerned citizen.2  The concerned citizen alleged a truck had ran her off 
the roadway and provided the exact make and color of the truck, the license 
plate on the truck, and the mile marker where the incident occurred.3  The 
dispatch team then broadcasted that information to highway patrol officers.4 
 
1.  Navarette v. California, 134 S. Ct. 1683, 1686 (2014).  
2.  Id. 
3.  Id. at 1686-87. The county dispatcher reported the tip as follows:  “Showing southbound 
Highway 1 at mile marker 88, Silver Ford 150 pickup.  Plate of 8-David-94925.  Ran the reporting 
party off the roadway and was last seen approximately five [minutes] ago.”  Id. 
4.  Id. at 1687. 
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Two highway patrol officers responded to the broadcast. The first 
officer passed the vehicle matching the description at 4:00 p.m. near mile 
marker sixty-nine.5  The officer pulled this vehicle over at about 4:05 p.m.6  
The second officer responding to the broadcast then arrived on the scene.7  
Upon approaching the vehicle, the officers smelled marijuana.8  After 
searching the vehicle, the officers discovered thirty pounds of marijuana in 
the bed of the vehicle.9  The driver of the vehicle, Lorenzo Prado Navarette, 
and the passenger, José Prado Navarette, were subsequently arrested.10 
At trial, the petitioners moved to suppress the evidence of the 
marijuana, arguing that the traffic stop was a violation of the Fourth 
Amendment because the officer lacked reasonable suspicion of criminal 
activity.11  Both the magistrate and the superior court found the traffic stop 
did not violate the Fourth Amendment.12  The California Court of Appeals 
affirmed the Superior Court’s judgment determining that the officer had 
reasonable suspicion to make the traffic stop.13  Consequently, the 
petitioners pled guilty to transporting marijuana and received ninety days in 
jail plus three years of probation.14  The California Supreme Court denied 
review.15  The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari and affirmed 
the court of appeals’s conclusion.16 
II. LEGAL BACKGROUND 
The Fourth Amendment requires that searches and seizures be 
reasonable.17  The Fourth Amendment provides in pertinent part:  “[t]he 
right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, 
against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated . . . .”18  
An exception to the Fourth Amendment permits law enforcement to 
conduct brief investigative stops when a law enforcement officer reasonably 
 
5.  Id. 
6.  Id.  
7.  Id. 
8.  Id.  
9.  Id.  
10. Id. 
11. Id.  
12. Id. 
13.  Id. 
14. Id.  
15. Id. 
16. Id. 
17. U.S. CONST. amend. IV. 
18. Id. 
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believes that “criminal activity may be afoot . . . .”19  In other words, law 
enforcement may temporarily detain an individual when the officer 
reasonably believes that the individual has committed a crime, is 
committing a crime, or is about to commit a crime.20  While contextualizing 
Navarette, it is important to understand the background of the Court’s 
interpretation of reasonable suspicion and to examine the precedent of 
anonymous tips involving investigatory stops. 
A. REASONABLE SUSPICION PERMITTING INVESTIGATIVE STOPS 
The Supreme Court has permitted law enforcement to conduct 
investigative stops when an officer has a reasonable and articulable belief 
that an individual is involved in criminal conduct.21  In Terry v. Ohio, a 
plain-clothed officer observed two men standing on the corner of the 
street.22  The officer observed one man walk down the street, pause 
momentarily to look into a store window, then turn around to return to the 
street corner with the other man.23  The officer then observed the other man 
walk down the street to stop and look in the same window as the first 
man.24  The officer watched the two men for a period of time in which they 
both continued to repeat this behavior about twelve times in total between 
them.25  The officer grew suspicious of the men while observing them.26  
He suspected the men of inspecting the store in preparation for robbing it.27  
The officer testified that he thought they might have a gun.28  He then 
approached the men and asked for identification.29  When one man 
mumbled something, the officer grabbed Terry, spun him around, and 
patted down the outside of his clothing.30  The search revealed a weapon in 
Terry’s coat, and a subsequent search of the other man also revealed a 
gun.31  The officer testified that he had worked this patrol for a substantial 
 
19. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 30 (1968); see also United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 
417-18 (1981) (permitting investigative stops under the totality of the circumstances when an 
officer has “a particularized and objective basis for suspecting the particular person stopped of 
criminal activity.”). 
20. See Cortez, 449 U.S. at 417-18. 
21. See id. 
22. Terry, 392 U.S. at 5.. 
23. Id. at 6. 
24. Id. 
25. Id. 
26. Id. 
27. Id. 
28. Id. 
29. Id. 
30. Id. at 7. 
31. Id. 
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period of time and had developed habits of watching people to determine 
whether suspicious activity was occurring.32 
The men were charged with carrying a concealed weapon, and they 
subsequently moved to suppress the evidence on the basis of the stop being 
unlawful.33  The Supreme Court held that the search did not violate the 
Fourth Amendment because the officer reasonably believed the men were 
armed and dangerous.34  The Court reasoned that the stop was justified 
because the officer’s observance of unusual behavior, coupled with his 
experience, allowed him to reasonably conclude that the individuals were 
armed and dangerous and that “criminal activity may be afoot . . . .”35  The 
Terry decision provides a definition of reasonable suspicion permitting an 
investigative stop:  “specific and articulable facts which, taken together 
with rational inferences from those facts, reasonably warrant that intrusion” 
leading an officer to reasonably believe that “criminal activity is afoot.”36 
The Terry decision provides that a law enforcement officer may not 
base reasonable suspicion upon “inchoate and unparticularized suspicion of 
‘hunch,’” but rather he must base it upon “the specific reasonable inferences 
which he is entitled to draw from the facts in light of his experience.”37  
Reasonable suspicion is a less demanding standard than probable cause 
because the “level of suspicion is considerably less than proof of 
wrongdoing by a preponderance of the evidence.”38  Reasonable suspicion 
under the totality of the circumstances standard is “dependent upon both the 
content of information possessed by police and its degree of reliability.”39  
B. ANONYMOUS TIPS 
Supreme Court precedent permits law enforcement to make 
investigative stops based on anonymous tips.40  In Alabama v. White, a 
police department received an anonymous phone call with specific facts 
alleging that a woman would be leaving an apartment building at a certain 
time.41  The anonymous tipster gave police the specific make and color of 
 
32. Id. at 5. 
33. Id. at 6. 
34. Id. at 29. 
35. Id. at 30. 
36. Id. at 21. 
37. Id. at 27. 
38. United States v. Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1, 6 (1989). 
39. Alabama v. White, 496 U.S. 325, 330 (1990) (citing United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 
411, 417 (1981)).  
40. See Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143 (1972).  The Court in Adams provided that 
reasonable suspicion for a investigative stop can be based on information from another person, not 
just the officer’s personal observation.  Id. at 147. 
41. White, 496 U.S. at 327. 
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the vehicle and indicated the vehicle’s right taillight was broken.42  The 
tipster told police the woman would be driving to a specific motel and there 
would be cocaine in the car.43  Police officers observed the woman leave 
the apartment and get into the specific car.44  The officers followed the 
woman and stopped her just short of the motel alleged in the tip.45  The 
officers found marijuana and cocaine in the vehicle.46  The woman moved 
to suppress the drugs on Fourth Amendment grounds.47  The Supreme 
Court upheld the traffic stop, finding that under the totality of the 
circumstances, the anonymous tip was corroborated by the police 
observations and thusly exhibited sufficient indicia of reliability to justify 
the investigate stop.48  The Court reasoned that the anonymous tip rose to a 
higher level of reliability because of the tipster’s ability to predict the 
woman’s future behavior.49  The tipster’s ability to predict the woman’s 
future behavior demonstrated that the caller had a special familiarity with 
the woman’s affairs and police could reasonably believe that a person with 
inside information was likely to have access to reliable information.50 
The Court revisited the issue of anonymous tips in Florida v. J.L.51  In 
J.L., the Miami-Dade Police Department received an anonymous call 
reporting that a young man in a plaid shirt standing at a specific bus stop 
was carrying a gun.52  Officers approached the man in the plaid shirt, 
frisked him, and seized a gun; aside from what was reported in the tip, they 
had no reason to suspect illegal activity was afoot.53  The Court noted that 
the tip lacked reliability because it provided no predictive information and 
no indications of the caller’s knowledge or credibility.54  The Court 
reasoned that the officers’ corroboration of seeing the man in a plaid shirt at 
a bus stop was a bare-bones tip that did not show the caller had any 
knowledge of criminal activity.55  Thus, the Court held an anonymous tip 
 
42. Id. 
43. Id. 
44. Id. 
45. Id. 
46. Id. 
47. Id.  
48. Id. at 331. 
49. Id.  
50. Id.  The Court stated that because the caller’s predictions were verified, it was reasonable 
to believe that the caller was honest and well-informed of the woman’s  
activities—enough to justify stopping the woman’s car.  Id. 
51. 529 U.S. 266 (2000). 
52. Id. at 268. 
53. Id. 
54. Id. at 271. 
55. Id. 
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lacking indicia of reliability does not justify an investigative stop.56  The 
Court declined to adopt a firearm exception to the reliability analysis 
because it felt an automatic firearm exception would reach too far and allow 
anyone seeking to harass someone to simply place an anonymous tip of an 
individual carrying a gun, which would justify a search of that individual.57 
III. COURT’S ANALYSIS 
In Navarette v. California, Justice Thomas delivered the opinion of the 
Supreme Court, which held that the implicated stop did not violate the 
Fourth Amendment because, under the totality of the circumstances, the 
officer had reasonable suspicion that the driver was intoxicated.58  In order 
to reach this conclusion, the Court first found the caller had eyewitness 
knowledge of the alleged reckless driving, which supported the reliability of 
the anonymous tip.59  Next, the Court reasoned that the caller’s report of 
being run off the road created reasonable suspicion of an ongoing crime.60  
Then, the Court found the police officer’s failure to corroborate the alleged 
reckless behavior did not dismiss the reasonable suspicion of drunk 
driving.61 
A. THE MAJORITY OPINION 
When deciding the issue of whether the anonymous 911 tip created 
sufficient reasonable suspicion to permit the traffic stop, the Court first 
considered the reliability of the anonymous tip alleging the reckless 
driving.62  The Court then considered whether the 911 caller’s tip created 
reasonable suspicion of an ongoing crime such as drunk driving.63  Finally, 
the Court discussed the issue of the police officer’s failure to corroborate 
the alleged reckless behavior.64 
1. Reliability of the Anonymous Tip 
The Court concluded that the anonymous tip was sufficiently reliable 
for the officer to rely on the caller’s credibility to make the traffic stop.  
First, because the caller reported the specific details of the vehicle that had 
 
56. Id. at 274.  
57. Id. at 272-73. 
58. Navarette v. California, 134 S. Ct. 1683, 1686 (2014). 
59. Id. at 1689.  
60. Id. at 1690-91. 
61. Id. at 1691. 
62. Id. at 1688. 
63. Id. at 1690. 
64. Id. at 1691. 
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run her off the road, the caller provided eyewitness knowledge of the 
alleged dangerous driving.65  The Court reasoned that a driver’s claim of 
being run off the road by another vehicle implies that the caller knew the 
other car was driven dangerously.66  Thus, the Court noted the basis of the 
tipster’s knowledge further supported the reliability of the tip.67 
Next, the Court noted that the timeline of the events suggested that the 
caller called 911 shortly after she was run off the road.68  The Court stated:  
“That sort of contemporaneous report has long been treated as especially 
reliable.”69  The Court also noted that the stress of excitement caused by the 
startling nature of being run off the road was in line with the “present sense 
impressions” and “excited utterances” hearsay exceptions, both of which 
treat contemporaneous statements as trustworthy.70 
Finally, the Court noted that the caller’s use of the 911 emergency 
system provided further credibility to the caller’s tip.71  The Court reasoned 
that the 911 emergency system includes features that permit law 
enforcement to verify and trace important information about the caller, 
which acts as a safeguard preventing false reports.72  The Court found “a 
reasonable officer could conclude that a false tipster would think twice 
before using such a system.”73  Thus, the caller’s use of 911 was a relevant 
circumstance that justified the officer’s reliance on the information in the 
tip.74 
2. Reasonable Suspicion of Drunk Driving 
Next, the Court determined whether the caller’s report of being run off 
the road created reasonable suspicion of an ongoing crime—in contrast to 
 
65. Id. at 1689. 
66. Id. 
67. Id. (citing Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 234 (1983)). Gates provided:  “[An 
informant’s] explicit and detailed description of alleged wrongdoing, along with a statement that 
the event was observed firsthand, entitles his tip to greater weight than might otherwise be the 
case.”  Gates, 462 U.S. at 232 (alteration in original). 
68. Navarette, 134 S. Ct. at 1689.  Police located the truck roughly nineteen miles south of 
the location the caller alleged the reckless driving took place and roughly eighteen minutes after 
the 911 call.  Id. 
69. Id.  The Court pointed to evidence law, which treats contemporaneous statements as 
more trustworthy because “substantial contemporaneity of event and statement negate the 
likelihood of deliberate or conscious misrepresentation.”  Id. (quoting FED. R. EVID. 803(1) 
advisory committee’s note (2014)). 
70.  Id. 
71.  Id.  
72.  Id. at 1689-90. 
73.  Id. at 1690. 
74.  Id. 
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an isolated incident of past reckless conduct.75  The Court took a 
commonsense approach when discussing common behaviors indicative of 
drunk driving.76  The Court stated that a reliable tip alleging dangerous 
behaviors, such as weaving all over the road, crossing over the center line 
on a highway, and almost causing head-on collisions, would generally 
justify an officer to make a traffic stop on suspicion of drunk driving.77  In 
this case, the Court noted that the driver “reported more than a minor traffic 
[violation] and more than a conclusory allegation of drunk or reckless 
driving.”78  The caller reported a specific and dangerous act that caused the 
caller to be run off the road.79  The Court provided that the petitioner’s 
conduct “bears too great a resemblance to paradigmatic manifestations of 
drunk driving to be dismissed as an isolated example of recklessness.”80  
The Court did not find it unreasonable to stop the driver whose alleged 
conduct was indicative of drunk driving under these circumstances.81  The 
Court further noted that the petitioners’ argument that the reported behavior 
could be explained by a distracted driver was unavailing because the Court 
had consistently pointed out that reasonable suspicion does not need to 
disregard the possibility of innocent conduct.82 
3. Corroboration of Alleged Reckless Driving 
The majority spent little time on the issue of the police officer’s failure 
to observe any additional suspicious conduct after tailing the truck for five 
minutes.83  Justice Thomas stated that it is not surprising that the sight of a 
police car tailing a driver would invoke careful driving.84  The majority 
took the approach that the police officer did not need to corroborate the 
criminal activity alleged in the tip because the officer already had 
reasonable suspicion and it would be unsafe to allow a drunk driver another 
chance to cause dangerous results.85 
 
75.  Id. 
76.  Id. at 1690-91. 
77.  Id. 
78.  Id. at 1691. 
79.  Id. 
80.  Id.  The court suggests that lane-positioning problems, decreased vigilance, and impaired 
judgment—a combination of recognized drunk driving cues—can be inferred from the conduct of 
running another vehicle off the road.  Id. 
81.  Id. 
82.  Id. (citing United States v. Arvizu, 534 U.S. 266 (2002)). 
83.  Id. 
84.  Id. 
85.  Id. at 1691-92. 
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B. JUSTICE SCALIA’S DISSENTING OPINION 
Under the majority’s opinion, an uncorroborated, yet reliable, 
anonymous tip can provide an officer with reasonable suspicion to make an 
investigative traffic stop.86  Justice Scalia delivered a strongly-worded 
dissent calling into doubt:  “(1) that anonymous 911 reports of traffic 
violations are reliable so long as they correctly identify a car and its 
location, and (2) that a single instance of careless or reckless driving 
necessarily supports a reasonable suspicion of drunkeness.”87  Justice Scalia 
described the new rule stemming from the majority opinion thusly:  “[s]o 
long as the caller identifies where the car is, anonymous claims of a single 
instance of possibly careless or reckless driving, called in to 911, will 
support a traffic stop.”88 
Justice Thomas, writing for the majority, found the caller’s specific 
details about the vehicle’s make, license plate, and location to be 
sufficiently reliable.  Justice Scalia argued that these facts are  
generally-available knowledge that anyone who saw the car and wanted it 
stopped would see.89  Justice Scalia further suggested that the generally 
available knowledge provided by the caller “in no way makes it plausible 
that the tipster saw the car run someone off the road.”90  Justice Scalia also 
disagreed with the majority’s reliance on the contemporaneous nature of the 
911 call.91 
In addition, Justice Scalia disagreed with the majority’s analysis of the 
reliability of the 911 emergency system.92  Justice Scalia disagreed that the 
emergency system can easily determine important information regarding the 
caller.93  He also found the fact that 911 callers could be identified 
unpersuasive because the identity and location of the caller in this case was 
unknown.94  Furthermore, he asserted it only matters if the caller is aware 
that his or her information might be discovered.95 
 
86.  Id. at 1692 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
87.  Id. at 1697.  
88.  Id. at 1692. 
89.  Id. at 1693. 
90.  Id. 
91.  Id. at 1693-94.  Justice Scalia pointed out that the caller had time to observe the license 
plate, stop her car, and write down the license plate number, which, he says, would be a difficult 
task if she was run off the road and the car was speeding off.  Id. at 1694.  Justice Scalia adds that 
this is “[p]lenty of time to dissemble or embellish” the facts.  Id. 
92.  Id. at 1694. 
93.  Id. 
94.  Id. 
95.  Id. 
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Justice Scalia also disagreed with the majority’s interpretation that the 
caller’s report rose to the level of reasonable suspicion of drunk driving.96  
The caller never made an accusation of drunk driving.97  According to 
Justice Scalia, it was entirely plausible that the petitioner may have been 
distracted and swerved as a result.98  Justice Scalia stated:  “I fail how to see 
how reasonable suspicion of a discrete instance of irregular or hazardous 
driving generates a reasonable suspicion of ongoing intoxicated driving.”99  
In order to make an investigate traffic stop, there must be suspicion of an 
ongoing crime.100 
The dissenting opinion further disagreed with the majority’s view that 
the anonymous tip did not need to be corroborated.101  Justice Scalia 
pointed to the fact that the officers followed the petitioners for five minutes 
and did not witness a single traffic violation.102  Justice Scalia suggested 
that the anonymous tip was discredited when the officers did not observe a 
traffic violation.103  He suggested that the majority seemed to think that a 
drunk driver has the ability to make a conscious decision to no longer drive 
indicative of a drunk driver.104  He also took the viewpoint that if the driver 
was drunk, the driver would have undoubtedly exhibited irregular driving 
conduct again.105  Thus, Justice Scalia found that because the driver failed 
to commit another infraction and the only basis for the further investigation 
was a vague and anonymous tip, the Fourth Amendment required the driver 
to be left alone.106 
IV. IMPACT OF DECISION AND APPLICATION TO  
NORTH DAKOTA LAW 
Drunk driving is a very serious and dangerous problem in the state of 
North Dakota107 and across the nation.108  Under the Court’s holding in 
 
96.  Id. at 1695. 
97.  Id. 
98.  Id. 
99.  Id. (emphasis in original). 
100. Id. 
101. Id. at 1696. 
102. Id.  
103. Id.  Scalia provided a hypothetical implying that if a police officer’s personal 
observation is contrary to the informant’s tip, than that tip is discredited.  Id. 
104. Id. at 1697. 
105. Id. 
106. Id.  
107. North Dakota Tops Nation in Drunk Driving Deaths, VALLEY NEWS LIVE (Mar. 12, 
2013), http://www.valleynewslive.com/story/21604798/north-dakota-tops-nation-indrunk-driving-
deaths (reporting that 45 percent of deaths in North Dakota involve drunk driving).  
108. DEPT. OF TRANSP, NAT’L HIGHWAY TRAFFIC SAFETY ADMIN., Traffic Safety Facts 
2012 Data: Alcohol-Impaired Driving (Dec. 2013), http://www-nrd nhtsa.dot.gov/Pubs/ 
           
634 NORTH DAKOTA LAW REVIEW [VOL. 90:623 
Navarette, law enforcement will be able to make a valid investigative traffic 
stop with minimal justification based on an anonymous tip.109  This creates 
a difficult dilemma.  On one hand, Navarette promotes public safety 
concerns surrounding drunk driving.110  On the other hand, it puts every 
person who chooses to drive at risk of a potentially intrusive traffic stop.111 
A. ANONYMOUS YET RELIABLE TIP? 
If the majority had followed the ruling in J.L., the anonymous tip 
would have lacked the indicia of reliability to justify the investigative traffic 
stop.112  After Navarette, however, all that is required to report a tip of 
reckless driving is to provide the make of the car, license plate, location, 
and a single instance of reckless or irregular driving.113  Like the 
anonymous tip in J.L. of a young man standing by a bus stop in a plaid 
shirt, the specific details of the truck’s make, license plate, and location 
reported by the anonymous caller in Navarette lack the reliability to justify 
an investigative stop.114  The details of the vehicle provide no predictive 
information to prove that the caller had any knowledge of criminal activity 
by the petitioner.115  The description of the vehicle could have been 
provided by anyone on the road.116 
The Navarette decision has provided a rule that mere specific, 
anonymous claims of a traffic violation will permit investigative traffic 
stops.117  Anyone with a grudge and knowledge of a person’s car and 
location can now make an anonymous tip that will likely result in an 
intrusive and potentially unwarranted traffic stop.118  Given this ruling, it is 
likely that traffic stops based on anonymous tips alleging reckless conduct 
will increase in the future. 
 
811870.pdf (noting that the number of deaths involving alcohol-impaired driving crashes was 
10,322 in 2012). 
109. Navarette, 134 S. Ct. at 1692 (Scalia, J., dissenting).  Justice Scalia recited the rule from 
the majority in his dissent as:  “So long as the caller identifies where the car is, anonymous claims 
of a single instance of possibly careless or reckless driving, called in to 911, will support a traffic 
stop.”  Id. 
110. Id. at 1691-92 (majority opinion). 
111. Id. at 1697 (Scalia, J., dissenting).  In dissent, Justice Scalia provided: “Drunken driving 
is a serious matter, but so is the loss of our freedom to come and go as we please without police 
interference.”  Id. 
112. See discussion supra Part III.B. 
113. Navarette, 134 S. Ct. at 1692 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
114. Id. at 1693. 
115. See discussion supra Part III.B. 
116. Navarette, 134 S. Ct. at 1692 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
117. Id.  
118. Id. at 1697.  “All the malevolent 911 caller need to do is assert a traffic violation, and 
the targeted car will be stopped, forcibly if necessary, by the police.”  Id.  
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B. THE ISSUE OF ANONYMOUS TIPS WITHOUT POLICE 
 CORROBORATION CREATING REASONABLE SUSPICION  
 OF DRUNK DRIVING TO STOP A VEHICLE 
Prior to the Navarette decision, the North Dakota Supreme Court had 
ruled on the issue of anonymous tips creating reasonable suspicion to stop a 
vehicle without police corroboration.119  In Anderson v. Director, North 
Dakota Department of Transportation, a motorist called the Cass County 
Sheriff’s Office to report a potentially reckless or drunk driver because the 
caller had allegedly seen the driver hit a construction cone.120  The caller 
reported the license plate number, color, and make of the vehicle.121  The 
dispatcher only relayed to the responding officer that the caller had 
witnessed a “possible reckless or drunk driver”—not that the driver had hit 
a construction cone.122  The responding deputy followed the driver for 
about two miles before making a traffic stop.123  The deputy did not observe 
the driver commit any traffic violations before the stop.124  The driver was 
subsequently arrested for drunk driving.125 
The Anderson court detailed three situations providing an officer with 
reasonable suspicion to make a traffic stop, one of which was “when the 
officer received tips from other police officers or informants, which were 
then corroborated by the officer’s own observations.”126  The court 
concluded that the “bare assertion” of a potentially drunk driver without any 
police corroboration did not rise to the level of “sufficient quantity to 
provide the reasonable and articulable suspicion sufficient to justify the 
stop . . . .”127 
In light of Navarette, the “bare assertion” of a potentially drunk driver 
now likely rises to the level of reasonable suspicion to justify an 
investigative traffic stop with no police corroboration of criminal activity.  
Police officers can now make a traffic stop based on an anonymous tip 
specifying the car, the location, and alleging reckless driving  
conduct—without the officer ever personally witnessing any criminal 
activity.  Thus, the number of traffic stops in North Dakota for reckless or 
drunk driving based on anonymous tips will likely increase. 
 
119. See Anderson v. Dir., N.D. Dept. of Transp., 2005 ND 97, 696 N.W.2d 918. 
120. Id. ¶ 2, 696 N.W.2d at 919. 
121. Id. 
122. Id. ¶ 19, 696 N.W.2d at 923. 
123. Id. ¶ 3, 696 N.W.2d at 919. 
124. Id. 
125. Id. ¶ 4.  
126. Id. ¶ 9, 696 N.W.2d at 920 (citing In re T.J.K., 1999 ND 152, 598 N.W.2d 781). 
127. Id. ¶¶ 20-21, 696 N.W.2d at 923. 
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V. CONCLUSION 
In Navarette, the Supreme Court held that the traffic stop conducted 
pursuant to an anonymous tip alleging drunk driving did not violate the 
Fourth Amendment because, under the totality of the circumstances, the 
officer had reasonable suspicion to make a traffic stop.128  While this 
decision promotes the safety of the public by making it easier for law 
enforcement to take drunk drivers off the road, it puts every driver on the 
road at risk of a potentially intrusive traffic stop.  As a result of Navarette, 
traffic stops for reckless or drunk driving based upon anonymous tips will 
likely increase. 
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